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Popular opinion and many historians portray the effects of  Soviet espionage on the 
United States as disastrous. Although covert Soviet efforts undeniably harmed America, 
their extent and gravity has been greatly exaggerated. This paper evaluates primary 
and secondary sources on the subject to strike a delicate balance between minimizing 
and inflating the effects of  Soviet activities. It acknowledges that espionage did some 
damage, but questions the legal status, extent, and effect of  much of  the Soviets’ “stolen” 
information, ultimately arguing that most Soviet espionage was actually more harmful to 
the Soviet Union than to the United States.
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RUSSIAN COLONEL IS INDICTED 
HERE AS TOP SPY IN U.S.1 
CHIEF ‘RUSSIAN SPY’ 
NAMED BY M’CARTHY: 
Senator Says He Has Link With State Department—
Tydings Speeds Hearing on Charge2 
ATOM AIDE IN WAR 
CALLED SOVIET SPY: 
Hickenlooper Says Photograph Shows 
Bomb Project Official With Russian Agents3 
Telegrams Show Genius In Soviet’s Spy Setup4 
These headlines from national newspapers in the 
1940s and 1950s epitomize the popular perception 
that Soviet espionage was everywhere in the United 
States and that such espionage was continually exacting 
disastrous consequences on the nation. Although many 
historians argue to this day that the results of  Soviet 
spying changed American history for the worse, it was 
not nearly as devastating as popular portrayals would 
have the nation believe. 
The following pages argue in support of  this assertion, 
based on a delicate balance between belittling and 
exaggerating the effects of  Soviet activities. Although 
Soviet espionage did result in some damage, most 
espionage was actually more harmful to the Soviet 
Union than the United States. The most dangerous 
spies were actually Americans, not Soviets, and United 
States counterintelligence substantially reduced the 
harm done by the Soviet Union.5
1 Mildred Murphy, “Russian Colonel is Indicted Here as 
Top Spy in U.S.,” New York Times, August 8, 1957, accessed 
November 7, 2015, from http://search.proquest.com/
docview/114187738?accountid=11667. This news article 
described the arrest of  illegal Soviet agent Rudolf  Ivanovich Abel.
2 William S. White, “Chief  ‘Russian Spy’ Named by 
M’Carthy,” New York Times, March 22, 1950, accessed 
November 7, 2015, from http://search.proquest.com/
docview/111481689?accountid=11667. The article reports on 
McCarthy’s attempt to reveal information based on some vague 
disclosures by his personal friend, J. Edgar Hoover, hence the 
inconclusive nature of  McCarthy’s accusations and Hoover’s 
refusal to cooperate by disclosing VENONA files.
3 “Atom Aide in War Called Soviet Spy,” New York Times, 
July 1, 1951, accessed November 7, 2015, from http://search.
proquest.com/docview/112214568?accountid=11667
4 Igor Gouzenko, “Telegrams Show Genius in Soviet’s 
Spy Setup,” Washington Post, August 9, 1948, accessed 
November 7, 2015 from http://search.proquest.com/docview/ 
152034537?accountid=11667. This is a report by the Soviet 
defector Gouzenko on part of  the Soviet’s elaborate spy system.
5 My sources are necessarily secondary in most cases, insofar 
as I have no security clearance to view classified FBI, CIA, and 
Any argument downplaying covert Soviet endeavors 
must begin with an admission that some espionage 
unquestionably led to detrimental consequences for 
the United States. Navy Chief  Warrant Officer and 
communications specialist John Walker betrayed 
nuclear submarine secrets, information about the 
United States Navy, and plans during the Vietnam 
War, which led to countless unnecessary deaths.6 In 
the words of  former CIA National Clandestine Service 
director Michael Sulick,  
John Walker’s compromising of  US naval 
capabilities cost the government millions of  
dollars to develop countermeasures. . . . Moreover, 
the damage caused by espionage cannot be 
calculated only in dollars. When Walker spied 
for the KGB, he had access to information about 
US bombing raids against North Vietnam. He 
passed that information to the Soviets, who in 
turn passed it to their North Vietnamese allies. 
In various towns and cities across the United 
States, a father lost a child, a son lost a father, or 
a sister lost a brother who was a pilot shot down 
over Vietnam because of  a spy’s betrayal.7
KGB files. But I have located authors who either were former 
KGB, FBI, or CIA agents, or authors granted special permission 
to access the archives of  these agencies. An excellent overview of  
the consequences of  Soviet espionage is found in Jerrold Schecter 
and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence 
Operations Changed American History, (Washington, D.C.: 
Brassey’s, Inc., 2002). A comprehensive analysis of  Soviet espionage 
from the viewpoint of  a former CIA agent can be found in the two 
books by Michael Sulick: Spying in America: Espionage from the 
Revolutionary War to the Dawn of  the Cold War (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), and American Spies: 
Espionage against the United States from the Cold War to the 
Present, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013). 
One of  the best sources from a KGB defector is Christopher 
Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The 
Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of  the KGB (New 
York: Basic Books, 1999). One of  the authoritative sources on the 
important Venona documents is John Earl Haynes and Harvey 
Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), and a good source on 
the briefly opened KGB archives is John Earl Haynes, Harvey 
Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of  the 
KGB in America, with translations by Philip Redko and Steven 
Shabad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). A final 
note concerning my sources: since the nature of  my argument 
is comprehensive (the overall effect of  Soviet espionage), I have 
lightly touched upon dozens of  instances and persons rather than 
delving deeply into any specific instance. For further research into 
each case, see the bibliographies of  the sources listed in this paper.
6 Sulick, Spying in America, 240.
7 Sulick, American Spies, 14.
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Due to the treachery of  Donald Maclean and Guy 
Burgess, two British officials in Washington D.C. who 
were working for the Soviets,  the Soviets “had full 
access to American strategic planning and operational 
orders for the Korean War. . . . Maclean and Burgess 
forwarded the date for MacArthur’s offensive north of  
the 38th parallel, November 26, 1950, to the Kremlin.”8 
Because of  such advance notice transferred from 
Moscow to the Chinese, Mao Zedong was able to spring 
a trap on MacArthur, costing many lives and a strategic 
setback. Some time later, the same two agents informed 
Moscow of  President Truman and the United Nation’s 
intention not to use the atomic bomb in the war—
information that greatly emboldened the Communists.9 
In addition to the above instances of  true injury to the 
United States military, John Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and 
Alexander Vassiliev in Spies: The Rise and Fall of  the 
KGB in America list countless other American traitors 
in the government, military forces, and elsewhere who 
have now been definitively proven Soviet spies by KGB 
archives, the decoded VENONA messages, and the 
testimony of  defectors. Strategically positioned traitors 
included Assistant Secretary of  the Treasury, Harry 
Dexter White and atomic bomb chemist Harry Gold. 
White graduated from Harvard with a PhD in 
economics and quickly started work in the United States 
Department of  the Treasury in 1934, becoming the 
most influential individual in the department besides the 
actual Secretary of  the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr. Although not a Communist himself, White was 
a “fellow traveler,” an agent who was fully aware of  
the destination of  the information that he passed on 
through spy handler Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. 
White was also partially responsible for Operation 
Snow, an indirect Soviet mission that resulted in the 
United States’ hardline ultimatum against Japan just 
before Pearl Harbor. In addition, White exposed US 
diplomatic positions before key conferences following 
World War II, enabling the Soviets to safely push their 
own demands because they knew American priorities 
ahead of  time. White also wheedled permission from the 
Treasury Department to give the Soviets the plates and 
information necessary to print the new West German 
currency, Allied Marks (AM), in East Germany. When 
the Soviets subsequently mass produced the marks in 
East Germany while the United States was carefully 
trying to regulate the same marks in West Germany, the 
entire German economy was completely destabilized. 
This destabilization forced the United States to reform 
the currency in West Germany to prevent economic 
collapse. The irritated Soviets responded to the currency 
8 Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 191-192.
9 Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 192-193.
reform and several other Allied actions with the Berlin 
Blockade of  1948-1949.10 
Despite the gravity of  these instances, the Soviet Union 
acquired most of  its potentially harmful information 
legally. If  the war had broken out between the two 
nations, the intelligence gathered would definitely have 
set the United States at more of  a disadvantage than if  
no such spying had occurred. But according to former 
head of  the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, J. Edgar 
Hoover, 
Many phases of  Soviet intelligence gathering . 
. . do not involve violations of  [US] laws. The 
Soviets exploit fully the democratic freedoms 
of  this country and gather legally much data in 
the public realm. One defector has estimated 
that the Soviet Military Attaché’s office in the 
United States is able to obtain legally 95% of  the 
material useful for its intelligence objectives.11
In other words, the damage done exclusively by illegal 
espionage was not nearly as devastating as popularly 
perceived.12 
Another common misconception is that the United 
States was infested with Russians sent straight from the 
Soviet Union to steal the top secret files in Washington, 
10 Sulick, Spying in America, 221-226; Haynes, Spies, 258-
262; Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 119-123; David Rees, 
Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York: Coward, 
McCann & Geoghegan, 1973), 9-13. Schecter and Schecter in 
Sacred Secrets, 122, cite an NKVD message from the Russian 
Intelligence Archives clearly indicating that the Soviets were 
responsible for urging White to obtain these plates and permission 
from the United States: “MAY [Stepan Apresian, NKVD rezident 
in New York] reported 14 April that LAWYER [code name for 
Harry Dexter White] following our instructions passed through 
ROBERT [Silvermaster] attained the positive decision of  the 
Treasury Department to provide the Soviet side with the plates 
for engraving German occupation marks, namely the consent was 
given to produce for the Red Army two billion occupation marks. 
Signed OVAKIMIAN. Note: Immediately inform t. [for tovarich 
Comrade] Mikoyan.” 
11 J. Edgar Hoover, “The U.S. Businessman Faces the Soviet 
Spy,” Harvard Business Review 42, no. 1 (January 1964): 143, 
accessed November 8, 2015, from Business Source Complete, 
EBSCOhost.
12 Sulick, American Spies, 15.
Despite the gravity of these 
instances, the Soviet Union acquired 
most of its potentially harmful 
information legally. 
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D.C. In reality, very few Russians had direct access 
to anything of  interest to the KGB or its predecessor, 
sister, and successor agencies.13 In the opinion of  Yuri 
Modin, KGB controller of  an English spy ring called 
the Cambridge Ring, “We [the Soviets] were leery of  
sending people out of  the Soviet Union for fear of  
defections. Most of  our officers worked in Moscow, with 
the result that the few men posted in foreign countries 
had a workload so crushing that many of  them cracked 
under the pressure.”14 Instead, a few Soviet “handlers” 
operated networks of  American traitors who were 
strategically positioned to acquire valuable information. 
For example, Viktor Cherkashin, Soviet head of  the 
counterintelligence in Washington, D.C., was trained 
specifically to recruit US traitors and transmit their 
harvests of  classified materials back to the Soviet Union. 
Cherkashin did not disappoint. He was responsible 
for recruiting and collecting information from CIA 
officer Aldrich Ames (who betrayed several CIA agents 
operating in the Soviet Union to their deaths) and FBI 
special agent Robert Hanssen (who sold information to 
the Soviets). But Cherkashin himself  was not invading 
the FBI files or discovering CIA double agents.15 
Thus, while Soviets were needed to initially recruit 
and subsequently instruct and receive documents from 
American agents, all of  the major espionage crimes 
were committed by Americans in high positions of  trust 
(Hiss, White, Weisband, and the Rosenbergs, among 
many others), and arguably could never have been 
accomplished by native-born Soviets. As the Schecters 
point out in Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence 
Operations Changed American History, “the success of  
Soviet intelligence depended on Americans being duped 
13 For an overview of  the evolution of  the various Soviet 
intelligence agencies and their heads see the appendices pp. 305-
315 in Robert Pringle, Historical Dictionary of  Russian and 
Soviet Intelligence, Historical Dictionaries of  Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 5 (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 
Inc., 2006).
14 Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London: 
Headline, 1994), 133. Cited in Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword 
and the Shield.
15 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 434; 
Viktor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer, Spy Handler: Memoir of  a 
KGB Officer, The True Story of  the Man Who Recruited Robert 
Hanssen and Aldrich Ames (New York: Basic Books, 2005).
into hurting themselves.”16 And indeed, those Americans 
who betrayed the largest secrets actually sought out 
KGB agents with whom to share their materials. For 
example, Julius Rosenberg, betrayer of  important 
information on the atomic bomb, was originally an 
enthusiastic member of  the Young Communist League 
and independently offered his services to Jacob Golos, a 
leader in the Communist Party of  the United States of  
America (CPUSA) and an agent handler for the Soviets. 
In the representative examples listed above, Soviets per 
se did not cause substantial damage to the nation or its 
interests abroad.17 
Moreover, the use of  American traitors was actually 
a flaw in the Soviet espionage system that caused 
considerable angst for them and joy among their 
American counterparts in the FBI and CIA. Motivations 
for Americans to turn over information to the Soviets, 
whether ideological or monetary, often became 
irrelevant or led to the discovery of  American traitors. 
One of  the more common motivations for Americans 
to betray their country in the 1920s and 1930s that 
was later abandoned was ideological. Members of  
the CPUSA and other sympathizers viewed the 
Soviet Union as the ideal political system and utopia 
on earth and saw themselves as supporters of  a great 
cause. Such traitors frequently scorned any monetary 
remunerations offered and considered Soviet medals of  
honor the highest reward possible.18 
One such ideologically motivated spy was Harry Gold, 
a Jewish-American atomic chemist who became an 
information courier for the Soviet project “Enormous” 
(the espionage operation that enabled them to accelerate 
their construction of  the atomic bomb). Gold stated that 
he had “never intended any harm to the United States. 
For I have always steadfastly considered that first and 
finally I am an American citizen.”19 Instead, he said the 
Soviets “did a superb job of  psychological evaluation 
on me . . . on three principal themes. The first was the 
matter of  anti-Semitism. . . . [T]he only country in the 
world where anti-Semitism is a crime against the state 
16 Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 187. This page also 
summarizes some of  the major negative results of  espionage by 
well-meaning American traitors.
17 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 295, 333. Others who sought 
out Soviets were Theodore Hall, Gregory Silvermaster, Charles 
Kramer, and Victor Perlo.
18 Haynes, Venona, 333-335; Schecter and Schecter, Sacred 
Secrets, 187; Sulick, American Spies, 7-10; Sulick, Spying in 
America, 266-267.
19 Harry Gold, Sentencing Statement, July 20, 1950. Legal 
Papers of  Augustus S. Ballard, Special Collections, Paley Library, 
Temple University, cited in Allen Hornblum, The Invisible Harry 
Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb, (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 364.
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is the Soviet Union.”20 Whenever he began to doubt 
the value of  his covert work, Gold reassured himself  
with “the idea of  helping the people of  the Soviet 
Union, helping these people live a little better than they 
had before.”21 However, after the general economic 
poverty and shortcomings of  communism began to 
show during Stalin’s purges and pact with Hitler, many 
Americans became disillusioned with the system and no 
longer considered the Soviet Union worth supporting. 
As a result, they defected and revealed to the FBI 
and CIA whatever they knew about the Soviet system 
and the extent of  American secrets already betrayed 
to the Soviet Union. In Harry Gold’s case, he slowly 
realized that the Soviet Union was not the utopia he 
had envisioned: “I looked at what was happening in 
the countries that the Soviet Union was taking over. I 
thought I was helping destroy one monstrosity, and I 
had created a worse one, or helped strengthen another 
one.”22 When Gold defected, he revealed critical 
evidence about the entire Soviet “Enormous” project, 
including the activities of  such agents as the Rosenbergs. 
In short, ideological motivation proved hazardous to 
the Soviet Union because it quickly vanished as the 
Cold War progressed.23
The more common incentive, especially later in the 
clandestine conflict between the superpowers, was 
money. The Department of  Defense concluded that 
between 1947 and 2001 “Americans most consistently 
have cited money as the dominant motive for espionage 
and over time money has increased in predominance 
among motives. . . . Of  individuals who professed a 
single motive for espionage, one-fourth of  the civilians 
20 Hornblum, The Invisible Harry Gold, 305.
21 Hornblum, The Invisible Harry Gold, 306.
22 “Scope of  Soviet Activity in the United States,” hearing 
before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of  the 
Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Committee 
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-fourth Congress, 
second session, April 26, 1956, p. 1045, cited in Hornblum, The 
Invisible Harry Gold, 306.
23 Hornblum, The Invisible Harry Gold, x-xii; Haynes, 
Venona, 333-335; Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 187; Sulick, American 
Spies, 7-10; Sulick, Spying in America, 266-267. For a detailed 
description of  another such ideologically motivated and then 
disillusioned Soviet agent, see Whittaker Chambers’s book Witness 
(New York: Random House, 1952).
and three-fourths of  the military claimed they had spied 
for money.”24 Even before communism proved unable 
to create an earthly utopia, the Great Depression 
made Soviet offers of  financial assistance particularly 
persuasive and undermined some Americans’ faith in 
the West’s capitalist system that had allowed such a 
global economic disaster. But once again, this motivator 
had a built-in exposure mechanism: the American 
intelligence agencies could identify individuals who 
suddenly and inexplicably became wealthy. This tell-tale 
sign most often occurred among military enlisted men, 
such as army administrative specialist Clyde Conrad.25 
Conrad spent the majority of  his espionage career 
in the 8th Infantry Division in Germany after World 
War II and funneled to the Soviets information about 
the United States’ missile sites, oil supply pipelines, 
and ammunition dumps. In return, he was given over 
one million dollars; these riches eventually proved to 
be his downfall. In their search for the source of  the 
information leak, US counterintelligence was able 
to track down Conrad because of  the discrepancy 
between his meager pay and his suddenly extravagant 
lifestyle, complete with expensive art and inexplicable 
bank deposits of  nearly ten thousand dollars each. As 
Sulick observed, 
Often the very motives that drive one to spy lead 
to their exposure. The person who spies for the 
thrill of  it takes unnecessary risks and is caught. 
. . . And the one who spies for money, in spite of  
warnings by his handlers, will spend beyond his 
means; and his sudden, unexplained wealth will 
raise suspicions and lead to his demise.”26 
In all, choosing Americans to do their information 
gathering came with built-in and sometimes debilitating 
side effects for the Soviets.27
Aside from the Soviets’ faulty channels, it can be argued 
that in most cases the material that they managed to 
obtain did only limited harm to the United States. 
Recent revelations (the Mitrokhin Archive, VENONA, 
and various defectors) have established beyond a doubt 
that the Rosenbergs, Harry Gold, and others transmitted 
enough information to the Soviet Union for them to 
build their first nuclear weapon. But since they would 
24 Katherine Herbig and Martin Wiskoff, Espionage against 
the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001 (Monterey, CA: 
Defense and Personnel Security Research Center, 2002), quoted in 
Sulick, Spying in America, 266.
25 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 333-335; Schecter and 
Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 185-187; Sulick, American Spies, 7-10.
26 Sulick, American Spies, 10-11.
27 Sulick, American Spies, 141-148; Haynes and Klehr, 
Venona, 333-335; Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 185-187; 
Sulick, American Spies, 7-10.
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have developed such weapons independently, given a 
few more years, such espionage simply accelerated the 
process and reduced the cost. According to Haynes 
and Klehr in Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in 
America, “Given time and resources, the Soviet Union’s 
talented scientists and engineers would certainly 
have been able to construct an atomic bomb without 
assistance from spies.”28 And although such an argument 
is quite tenuous, one could even say that because the 
Soviet Union developed nuclear power, the Cold War 
never became hot. Both sides feared what was came to 
be called MAD (“mutually assured destruction”), which 
was a realization that a war between nuclear powers 
would be devastating and might not result in a clear 
victory for either side.29 
Another result of  Soviet connivance that actually aided 
the United States was Operation Snow, in which Harry 
Dexter White drafted an ultimatum against Japan 
which ultimately led to Pearl Harbor. This operation, 
though it did contribute to US involvement in World 
War II, helped to end the Great Depression. Economists 
and historians alike agree that World War II finally 
ended the Depression by moving a large swathe of  the 
workforce into the armed forces and by tremendously 
increasing the demand for workers to produce supplies 
and weapons for the troops. The war certainly killed 
millions of  people and destroyed much of  Europe, 
but it did end one of  the darkest economic periods in 
America’s history. And the United States’ entrance into 
the war was helped along by Soviet tool Harry Dexter 
White in Operation Snow. Although White’s role was 
not decisive, it did at least facilitate such a decision, and 
thus initiate the process of  economic recovery from the 
Great Depression.30
While this case for Soviet espionage benefiting the United 
States may be somewhat dubious, such activities almost 
definitely set the Soviet Union itself  at a disadvantage. 
An inherent flaw in the Soviets’ policy of  pilfering as 
much information as possible from the United States 
28 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 333.
29 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 333; Haynes, Klehr, and 
Vassiliev, Spies, 143. The independent development of  nuclear 
capacity by other nations is also proof  that the Soviet Union 
would have eventually developed such weapons even without the 
assistance of  US traitors. A detailed treatment of  the MAD policy 
and variations on it can be found in Corbin Fowler’s “U.S. Nuclear 
Warfighting Policy: A Critique,” Public Affairs Quarterly 2, no. 
3 (July 1988): 85–95, accessed November 21, 2015, http://www.
jstor.org/stable/40435686.
30 For one treatment of  WWII’s role in ending the Great 
Depression, see J. R. Vernon’s “World War II Fiscal Policies and 
the End of  the Great Depression,” The Journal of  Economic 
History 54, no. 4. (December 1994): 850–68, accessed November 
21, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2123613. Schecter, Sacred 
Secrets, 22-45.
was that the Soviet Union was necessarily always a step 
behind the US. No matter how many nuclear secrets, 
B-25 bomber blueprints, and commercial engine designs 
they stole, the Soviets could only match their rival’s 
weapons, not exceed them. In the opinion of  Soviet 
rocket scientist Sergo Beria, whose father Lavrenti Beria 
had helped produce the first Soviet atomic bomb, “in the 
1930s and 1940s, Soviet intelligence was like a vacuum 
cleaner, sucking up whatever technology it could lay 
its hands on. The take included atomic bomb secrets, 
proximity fuses, the design for safety shaving razors, the 
process for refining sugar, and the formula for synthetic 
rubber.” But despite all of  the benefits, “Beria believed 
this pattern for developing technology led to the demise 
of  the Soviet Union. No society can prosper, he said, if  
it always has to try to recreate the technology after it has 
already succeeded elsewhere.” In a very apt analogy, 
Beria continued: “Every street thief  runs out of  the 
money he has stolen; he can never get ahead because he 
has not learned how to make money. Thus . . . stealing 
technology leaves the thief  permanently trailing behind 
those he has robbed.”31 One can logically conclude, 
then, that not only did the United States not suffer as 
greatly as is commonly thought, but the Soviet Union 
actually experienced negative consequences from its 
own espionage.32
Another ironic result of  increased Soviet activities was 
the United States’ decision to build and strengthen its 
own intelligence agencies. Because the Soviet Union 
refused to share enough information during World 
War II, the United States decided to break the code 
of  its “ally’s” messages with the original intention of  
coordinating its efforts better. In the words of  William 
Crowell, Deputy Director of  the National Security 
Agency (1994-1997), “The Russians were a critical 
part of  success in the war. At that time they were the 
key to victory in Europe. We had no idea from them 
how they were doing. They just weren’t telling us.”33 In 
1943, Army intelligence suggested decoding the Soviet 
messages, that they had been collecting since Stalin had 
31 Interview with Sergo Beria by Vyacheslav Luchkov, Kiev, 
1996, quoted in Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 298.
32 Hoover, “The U.S. Businessman Faces the Soviet Spy.”
33 Interview with William Crowell, Maryland, September 23, 
1997, quoted in Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 93.
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signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler in 1939, 
and started amassing intelligence officials to carry 
out this job. In this way, the United States uncovered 
what has come to be called VENONA, about 2,900 
Soviet messages containing a wealth of  evidence that 
hundreds of  Americans in high places were spying for 
the Soviets in ways that an ally should not have been. 
The small extant intelligence agencies in America were 
greatly expanded and invigorated once the United 
States realized the threat posed by Soviet and other 
espionage: “World War II created a vast expansion in 
the nation’s security and counterintelligence apparatus 
that included an expanded and powerful FBI, an active 
military intelligence division in the War Department, 
the Manhattan Project’s vigilant, if  not always effective, 
security staff, and the officious House of  Un-American 
Activities Committee.”34 In other words, thanks to 
Soviet attempts at infiltration, the United States’ 
counterintelligence improved markedly.35
Nor, as some would argue,36 was US counterintelligence 
ineffective. Persistent naiveté did indeed delay 
Americans from admitting that there were traitors in 
their midst. According to Sulick, 
Despite increased security measures and offensive 
counterespionage attempts to penetrate hostile 
intelligence services, America remained plagued 
by its chronic tendency toward disbelief  that its 
citizens in positions of  trust would betray the 
nation’s secrets. . . . During the Cold War every 
US government agency involved in national 
security, with the exception of  the Coast Guard, 
fell victim to espionage.37 
34 Katherine Sibley, “Soviet Military-Industrial Espionage in 
the United States and the Emergence of  an Espionage Paradigm 
in US-Soviet Relations, 1941-45,” American Communist History 
2, no. 1, (June 2003): 21, accessed November 8, 2015, from 
Humanities International Complete, EBSCOhost.
35 See Haynes and Klehr’s excellent book Venona for more 
information on the decoding of  these messages and their contents; 
Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 96.
36 One historian that supports this view is Athan Theoharis in 
his book Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence 
but Promoted the Politics of  McCarthysim in the Cold Wars Years 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002).
37 Sulick, Spying in America, 267.
Even the CIA and the FBI were infiltrated by Soviet 
agents Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, respectively. 
But, in many cases, counterintelligence succeeded. They 
decoded VENONA and used it to neutralize the effect 
of  many Soviet breaches into top secret information, 
removing various suspects from positions of  access and 
changing military plans and locations. Even though 
American counterintelligence did not release the 
VENONA files to the public—thus depriving the courts 
of  much-needed evidence to prosecute American 
traitors—this decision was extremely well thought out. 
In the analysis of  J. Edgar Hoover, “the defense attorney 
would immediately move that the messages be excluded, 
based on the hearsay evidence rule [because] neither the 
person who sent the message [a Soviet official] nor the 
person who received it [a Soviet official] was available 
to testify and thus the contents of  the message were 
purely hearsay as it related to the defendants.” Hoover 
went on to explain that even if  the VENONA messages 
were accepted as evidence, “the fragmentary nature 
of  the messages themselves, the assumptions made by 
the cryptographers in breaking the messages, and the 
questionable interpretations and translations involved, 
plus the extensive use of  cover names for persons and 
places, make the problem of  positive identification 
extremely difficult.” But the strongest argument against 
using VENONA as evidence in court was that the 
defense would demand access to the messages, and 
as FBI Assistant Director Alan Belmont noted in a 
February 1, 1956, memo,
request to have its cryptographers examine those 
messages which [the Army Security Agency] has 
been unsuccessful in breaking…on the premise 
that such messages, if  decoded, could exonerate 
their clients. This would lead to exposure of  
Government techniques and practices in the 
cryptography field . . . [and] act to the Bureau’s 
disadvantage since the additional messages 
would spotlight individuals on whom the Bureau 
had pending investigations.38
Summed up briefly, the VENONA messages stood little 
chance of  standing as convicting evidence in the courts 
and, if  left unexposed, they were useful in providing 
leads for collecting actual convicting evidence. So the 
counterintelligence, far from being the incompetents 
depicted by some historians, very probably made the 
wiser decision in keeping VENONA classified.39
 
In other ways, too, US counterintelligence proved 
successful in retarding or ameliorating Soviet damage, 
forcing the Soviets to abandon methods of  espionage. 
38 FBI Office Memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 7, 
quoted from Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 142.
         39 Sulick, Spying in America, 267-268. 
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Although Kim Philby (a British spy recruited by the 
Soviets as a double agent with access to US, Canadian, 
and Australian counterintelligence) and William 
Weisband (a US Army Intelligence cryptanalyst) 
eventually told the Soviets about VENONA, allowing 
the Soviet Union to change its codes and methods, so 
many US traitors had been exposed that the Soviet 
Union could no longer actively use these sources. 
Almost no one was prosecuted for espionage (FBI agent 
Judith Coplon was successfully convicted of  transferring 
classified information to Moscow but never sentenced, 
and the Rosenbergs were some of  the only American 
traitors to suffer the death penalty for their crimes), 
and yet hundreds of  agents were neutralized for fear 
of  providing the FBI hard evidence for prosecution and 
confirming the testimony of  such defectors as Whittaker 
Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, and Harry Gold. Thus, 
the KGB ceased using Harry Dexter White after 
Elizabeth Bentley defected and betrayed incriminating 
information about him.40
Any assessment of  Soviet espionage that claims the 
conseqences were minimal must begin, as this essay did, 
with an admission that the Soviet Union managed to 
injure the United States through agents such as John 
Walker and Harry Gold. But popular opinion has 
exaggerated the extent and nature of  the harm beyond 
all reasonable proportions. The purpose of  this essay has 
been to correct these misperceptions by demonstrating 
that the damage was done primarily by American agents, 
that many of  the consequences proved mildly beneficial 
to the United States and harmful to the Soviet Union, 
and that US counterintelligence successfully combatted 
or neutralized the effects of  much of  Soviet infiltration.
     40 Sulick, Spying in America, 211-217; Sulick, Spying in 
America, 209. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 261; “Plan 
of  measures,” March 1949, KGB file 43173, v.2c, pp. 25, 27, 
Alexander Vassiliev, Black Notebook [2007 English Translation], 
trans. Philip Redko (1993-96), 75, cited in Haynes, Klehr, and 
Vassiliev, Spies, 402-403. For a full account of  Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg’s nuclear espionage for the Soviet Union, see “Chapter 
2: Enormous: The KGB Attack on the Anglo-American Atomic 
Project,” from Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 33-144. 
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